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ABSTRACT
In seven! countries temporary terms of trade improvements have led to a deterioration
of the current account.Furthermore, manyof these countries failed to attain greater post-boom
growth rates. The point we make is that the structure of the fiscal process is critical in
determining outcomes. If fiscal control is unitary, then the consumption-smoothing effect is
operative, and representative-agent models of the current account have predictive power.
However, if control is divided among several fiscal claimants, a voracity effect appears which
counteracts the consumption-smoothing effect, leading to a deterioration of the current account
in response to a positive shock. We model the interaction among fiscal claimants as a dynamic
game, and show that in equilibrium aggregate appropriation increases more than the windfall
itself This resultsin a deterioration ofthe current account. We also show that all the windfall
is dissipated, with the country experiencing no increase in its growth rate. Lastly, we analyze
the experiences of seven countries which have enjoyed large windfalls.
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and NBER1 Introduction
An important prediction of representative-agent models of the current account is that a
temporary improvement in the terms of trade or in productivity leads to an improvement
in the current account if the discount factor is constant. This result arises from the use
of the current account as a consumption-smoothing device: dynamic optimization implies
countries should accumulate foreign assets during a period of temporarily high output or
terms of trade in order to maintain high consumption after the boom'.
The behaviour of several countries that have experienced major terms of trade shocks,
however, does not conform with this prediction. Individual country studies recurrently de-
scribe apparently perverse adjustment to terms of trade gains2. A negative correlation also
emerges in panel data regressions: in a sample of twenty-two countries which experienced
large terms of trade shocks in the 1970s and 1980s, the average effect of a terms of trade
improvement on the current account over a five year period is significantly negative3.
The negative correlation between the current account and the terms of trade could be
made consistent with the consumption smoothing hypothesis if one assumes that all the
shocks were expected to be permanent. However, this is difficult to justify because at least
two of the largest shocks in the 1970s, as we argue below, were perceived to be temporary:
thecoffeeshock of 1975 and the oil shock of 1979. The coffee boom was caused by a severe
frost, which destroyed a big proportion of the coffee trees. The oil shock was caused by the
Iranian revolution4.
The 1975 coffee shock generated a windfall for Cameroon equal to 9% of GDP during
1976-1979. and its current account improved by .4% of GDP, which is qualitatively what
a representative-agent model would predict. Costa Rica and Cote d'Ivoire also enjoyed
windfalls of 11% and 20% of GDP. In contrast to Cameroon, both countries managed to
spend more than entire windfall: their current accounts deteriorated by -1.7% and -5.7%
respectively.
Next we consider another anomaly. In many countries, fiscal policy, not private absorp-
tion, is the most important mechanism by which terms of trade shocks are transmitted to
the current account. The windfalls led in several cases to conditions of fiscal euphoria in
'See ObstfeldandRogoff (1994)Razin(1993), Sachs (1982), Svenss.on and Razin (1983).
2See 0db (1988), Cooper (1993), Gavin(1993),Little et a!. (1993) and Pinto (1987).
3See Appendix C. The countries in the sample are those studied in the World Bank projects on terms of
trade adjustment. See GeIb (1988) and Little et al. (1993).
'For the efffect.s of permanent shocks see Obstfeld (1982) and Glick and Rogoff (1992). However, Gavin
(1993) argues that with irreversible investment, even if the positive shock has a large permanent component,
a small amount of uncertainty should lead to a current account improvement.
1which the minister of finance was unable to stop the demands for greater fiscal resources
from strong liscalclaimants.In these conditions constraints on public spending were relaxed,
even to the extent that the increae in expenditure exceeded the size of thewindfall itself.
A third anomaly is the failure of a number of countries to convert terms of trade gains
into higher post-boom growth rates. GeIb (1988) and Little et a!. (1993) attribute this to
the fact that the windfalls were either consumed or invested in low return projects. Coun-
try studies describe how in many instances white elephant projects were undertaken,with
systematic cost and time overruns, and how local leaders clamoured for federal revenues to
he directed to inefficient local projects or used to finance consumption sprees that benefited
their constituents and patronage networks5.
Summing up,theexperiences of several countries that have enjoyed sizable terms of trade
booms during the 1970s present three anomalies. First, in several countries terms of trade
improvements led to a current account deterioration. Second, fiscal policy is typically the
source of current account deterioration. Governments often manage to increase spending
by a higher amount than the windfall itself, even when it is clear that the shock is tempo-
rary! Third. terms of trade booms often do not raise growth rates: windfalls are frequently
squandered in low return activities.
In this paper we develop a model of the current account which generates, in a setup of
optimizing agents. the anomalies listed above. In the model government expenditure is the
mechanism through which shocks are transmitted to the current account. The key difference
with respect to traditional approaches is that fiscal policy is not determined by a benevolent
social planner or some exogenous stochastic process. It is instead the outcome of a dynamic
game among several infinitely-lived groups that have the power to appropriate resources from
the national 6scal hudgeL In other respects, the model has a standard small open economy
specification. The model reduces to a representative agent one if there exists just a single
powerful hscal group.
To fix ideas we will use the concept of "voracity". We define voracity as the proportion
oi public assets and of the tax base that strong fiscal claimants appropriate. These groups
5Murphy (1983) studies 1614 projects of $100 million or more that were undertaken between 1970 and
1979 in 90 developing countries. She finds that 95 percent of the projects had a cost overrun of at least
too percent, and 98 percent of projects had time overruns between 1 and 2 years. Kaufman (1991) uses
data on economic rates of return (EER) after completion of 1200 projects financed by the World Bank and
IFt during the lObs and 1980s over 58 LDCs. Even for this closely supervised sample, he estimates that
the likelihood of a negative ERR is 13 percent in countries with high "policy distortions," while it drops
to 5 percent in low distortion countries. The likelihood of an ERR <10 percent is just 64 percent for high
distortion countries, while it increases to 76 percent in low distortion countries.
2are spending ministries, provincial governments, state-owned enterprises ESOEsI and strong
private corporations. Their claims are the financing of public investment projects, the under-
writing of loans for private investment projects, increased public payrolls, and consumption
and wage subsidies6.
The "voracity effect" is a more than proportional change in voracity, as defined above, itt
response to a shock. The voracity effect implies that if a shock generates a windfall of x% of
(IDP. then aggregate absorption increases by more than x% —even if the shock is perceived
to he temporary. As a result, current account deterioration takes place and a greater share
of resources ends up used inefficiently. In other words, the windfall is a curse.
We make two points in this paper. First, in the presence of temporary productivity or
terms of trade shocks, the consumption-smoothing hypothesis has predictive power only if
there exists a unitary fiscal structure as in Indonesia under Suharto or Chile under Pinochet
[see figure 1]. In this case the current account is positively correlated with the terms of
trade. However, when there is divided control over the fiscal process, the voracity effect is
also present. This effect counteracts the consumption-smoothing effect, inducing a decline in
the current account in response to a temporary terms of trade improvement: two examples
are Mexico in 1978-8 1 and Chile in the 1960s [see figure 1]. The second point we make is that
tinder a divided fiscal process the squandering of the windfall is not a policy mistake. It is the
equilibrium response of rational fiscal claimants who know that the windfall is temporary.7
Our argument is based on the observation that inefficient activities, such as unprofitable
investment projects, are mechanisms which allow a fiscal claimant to appropriate public
assets, and keep them safe from other strong groups. Such mechanism allow groups to store
these assets in ways that make it impossible for other strong groups to appropriate them.
These appropriated resources can be spent by the group at any time it desires —for its own
benefit, to benefit its constituents, or for patronage purposes. One example is white elephant
projects, many of which have built-in kickbacks that are deposited in secret bank accounts8.
Another is the appropriation of public assets for for pork-barrel projects or for programs
61t is welldocumented that SOEs andprovincial governments are important sources of pressure on fiscal
policy [seeFloydet al.(1984)and Little etal.(1993)].The ability of SOEs to extract resources from
thefiscal budget derives in part from the fact that SOEs typically arerequiredby politicians to achieve
objectives unrelated toeconomic efficiency, such as the provision of employment for political supporters of
the governmentorchargingprices below coston politicallysensitive goods (seeShleiferandVishny(1994)].
7A similarpoint ismadeby Blanchard. Lopez de Silanes, andSMeller(forthcoming).Theydocumenthow
windfallsfrom lawsuits won by publicly traded firms were usedbymanagers in W578 thatdidnot maximize
shareholders' value.
8the project, the better. Of course, one should notexpectlots of documented evidenceonthis type of
activity.Bangura (1987) provides some examples fromNigeria.
3Figure 1: Current Account and Government Spending
Responses to Terms of Trade Shocks
Mexico
Chile under Frei
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I—that generateunproductivejobs. Although socially inefficient,such programs insure a flow
offunds to the constituents of the powerful group. The privileged receipients will have
incentives to make donations and work hard in getting votes for the party. Indeed, if the
strong fiscal claimant is booted from power in the future, the constituents would lose their
unproductive jobs and pork-barrel contracts. .
Weformalize these ideas by assuming that powerful groups can accumulate wealth in two
ways: by permittinggrowthinthe stock of public assets, or by appropriating resources from
the fiscalbudget andsavingviaaprivate domain accumulation technology.The trade-off is
thattheprivatedomain technology hasalower rate of return, but public assets sufferfrom
a common poolprobleminthat theycanbeappropriated byothergroups.
Froni the perspectivc of powerful groups asawhole, itismore efficient to let the central
governmentinvestany windfall and allocate to each group resources whenever itneedsto
make a transfer to itsconstituents.However, if there is common accesstothe fiscal budget,
this is notanequilibrium because, like fishermen in unregulated waters, fiscal groups act
opportunistically.A group that tries to conserve the stockof public assets by refraining
from appropriation hasnoreason to believe it wilt gain from its sacrifice: the assets ithas
spared willbe capturedby some other group. On the contrary, ifthegroup appropriates
morepublicassetsnow it will bethericher for it. Althoughtherewill be fewerpublicassets
in the future, the cost will not be borne by it alone, but shared among all the groups.
There are two possible outcomes. One is an all-out fiscal war, in which eachgrouptries
to appropriate what it can when it can. This will reduce the central government to a state
of bankruptcy, inwhich all public assets are captured in the private turfs of thestrong
groups, yielding a very low return. The other is an outcome where each group limits its
appropriation rate. Each group's appropriation rate will be just low enough to leave other
groups indifferent between maintaining thestatusquo andstartingan all-out fiscalwar.
'Thefollowing quotes about Daley's Chicago and Cote d'lvoirearerevealing: "The third major part of
the Machine is money... The money comes from countless sources. From the patronage army, it goes into
the wards offices as dues, and part of it is turned into party headquarters... Contractors may be the biggest
of all contributors. Daley's public works program has poured billions into their pockets, and they in turn
have given millions back to the party in contributions. Much of it comes from contractors who are favored,
despite the seemingly fair system of competitive bidding." (Royko, 197.., 74-75.). The following quote about
Gate d'Ivoirc is Iron, Widner (1994, p.l33): "lobbying for local benefits and pork barrel projects remained
primarily the preserve of a privileged few who had access to government decision making... Their purpose
appears to have been to build followings that could be counted upon to move into the streets when the
patron's power was challenged. Such local benefits went primarily to the home areas of the President, the
party chief..., army chief..., and the Coulibaly family. Despite coinplaànts..., many other regional capitals
were underfunded and without basic services."
4A positive shock, by increasing national income, increases tax revenue and hence the
"raw" growthrateof public assets. The relaxation of the common budget constraint induces
each fiscal claimant to increase its appropriation rate from the national budget with the
knowledge that increased appropriation is now feasible without provoking other groups to
start an all-out fiscal war. In section 3 we show that it is not an equilibrium outcome for ev-
eryone to simply split the windfall. In a Markov perfect equilibrium aggregateappropriation
museincrease by more than the windfall [this is the voracity effect]. This surprising result
means that the windfall induces a decline in the growth rate of net public assets. Since these
are internationally tradeable, a current account deterioration results. Although the private
sector behaves optimally in our model, private consumption does not react to the shock
because the government captures all the gains from the terms of trade improvement through
taxation. The response of the private sector is limited to an asset reallocation between home
and foreign a.ssets'°
We also show that all the gains from the windfall aredissipated.The positive shock does
not lead to an increase in the growth rate of the economy, nor to an increase in welfare: as
aggregate appropriation out of public assets grows more than the windfall, a greater share
of resources ends up allocated to low return activities. This reduces the average growth
rate in the economv In equilibrium the increase in the raw growth rate of public assets is
completely counteracted by this asset reallocation".
In section 4, we present the experiences of some countries which had large temporary
terms of trade improvements and provide evidence supporting the setup and results of our
model.Weshow that fiscal structures vary importantly across countries and are critical
in country adjustment to terms of trade disturbances. In addition, we give examples of
investment projects where squandering occurred, in order to illustrate the mechanism by
which fiscal claimants appropriate public assets. The events studied are the 1975-79 coffee
shock, the 1979-82 oil shock, and the Chilean adjustment to copper price fluctuations. The
Chilean case is interesting because Chile underwent a dramatic shift in its policymaking
'°lnthe presence ortemporary shocks, a negative correlation between the current account and the terms
oftrade can also be generated in a representative-agent model if the real discount factor is variable hot
instance,if there are non-traded goods). See Dornbusch (1983) and Svensson and Basin (1983).
''Weconsider a dynamic model where fiscal appropriations vary in responsetoshocks instead of a setup
where the government simply spends all it can when it can because, in the latter setup, one could not
speak about an increase in voracity [i.e. an increase in the proportion of public assets appropriated by fiscal
claimants]. In such a setup appropriation would be maxisnised during every period anyway. Therefore, one
could not explain the anomaijes mentioned above, which depend crucially on changes in the appropriation
rate. Moreover, if the government were to appropriate all it could when it could, it would be troublesome
to even speak of a current account. -.
5regime [from divided to unitary] in the 1970s.
We choose a sample of countries for which there is consensus in the literature concerning
the structure of the fiscal system'2. For the coffee boom, we studied Cazneroon, Costa Rica
and Cote d'lvoire. For the 1979-82 oil shock, we studied Indonesia, Mexico and Nigeria.
Ne find that adjustment to terms of trade shocks appears to depend on fiscal structure. As
can be seen in tables 1 and 2, Cameroon, Indonesia and Chile under Pinochet, all of which
possesscd unitary fiscal regimes, saved the windfalls. In contrast, Costa Rica, Cote d'lvoire,
Mexico, Nigeria and Chile unde Frei, all of which had divided fiscal processes, fell victim to
fiscal euphoria and suffered current account deteriorations. As can be seen in table 3, the
former set of countries experienced higher growth rates than the latter in the years following
the positive shock.
Nigeria is a clear example of a country which wasted its windfall, as witnessed by negative
growth in the post-boom period. In nominal terms, Nigeria's exports increased from $12
billion in 1978 to $28 billion in 1980. By 1982, they reverted to $13 billion. Unresolved
regional tensions during the oil boom led to intense competition among state governments
for federal resources; one outcome was the duplication of investment projects, with large scale
steel mills being constructed in both Ajaokuta and Aladja regions. The estimated cost of
each plant was $1 billion. However, the costs turned out to be $4 and $2 billion respectively.
One estimate puts the cost of corruption associated with Nigerian public investment at 75
percent of the total cost of each project [see Bangura (1987)]. None of the plants has operated
at more than 25 percent capacity.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present an overview of the
model. In section 3 the model is laid out and the results are derived. Section 4 presents
some case studies. Section 5 concludes.
2 Overview of the Model
We extend a simple representative-agent model of the current account to allow for the exis-
tence of multiple fiscal claimants. The model is a differential game among fiscal claimants.
We solve for the interior Markov perfect equilibrium of this game, and obtain in dosed-form
the path of fiscal appropriations, net public assets and the current account.
The economy is composed of a government and a private sector. The government is
formed by iz groups that can extract resources from the fiscal budget. These groups share
a common constraint, which is the standard government budget constraint that the present
'2ominaImeasures offiscalstructure, suchas federalism or dictatorship, do not have predictive power.
6value of spendingheno more than the present value of tax revenue plus the value of publicly-
owned assets. As noted in the introduction, each groupis alsoable to accumulateits own
assetsto which other groups do not have access. As examples, a parastatal firm may invest
in extra plant capacity or a provincial government in local infrastructure.
Groups are infinitely lived. Every period, each one must choose the amount it will
appropriate from the common pool, and out of this what to spend (to benefit constituents)
and what to save in its private domain technology. To capture the porkba.rrel nature of
such investment projects, we assume that the raw (i.e. pre-appropriation) rate of return
on commonly-held public assets is greater than the rate of return on the private domain
accumulation technology available to fiscal claimants. Given the superior rate of return
on commonly-held public assets, there exist two Markov perfect equilibria. In the extreme
equilibrium, there is an all-out fiscal war in which every group appropriates as much public
assets as it can. In the other equilibrium, each group limits its appropriation rate. In the
interior equilibrium, each group sets its appropriation rate so that the post-appropriation
return on commonly-held assets is equal to the rate of return offered by the private domain
storage technology.
Suppose now that there is an improvement in the terms of trade that expands national
income and tax revenue. This increases the raw growth rate of public assets (i.e. the pre-
appropriation rate of return]. With a higher pre-appropriation public rate of return, a given
group can now increase its appropriation rate and still leave others with a post-appropriation
rate of return which is equal to the rate of return on their private technology. In equilibrium,
all of the n groups take advantage of this opportunity. We show in section 3 that the increase
in aggregate appropriation must exceed the size of the windfall. This reduces the growth
rate of public assets during the period of the boom, regardless of whether it is temporary or
permanent. As noted above, we term this the voracity effect.
The private sector is composed of a representative agent that can invest at home and
abroad. The government does not maximize the welfare of the representative consumer, but
rather it maximizes tax revenue'3. In response to positive shocks to the terms of trade, it
increases the tax rate in order to capture all the gains and, conversely, reduces the tax rate
in the face of negative shocks. This implies that the private consumption path is unaffected
by shocks. Hence, domestic investment is the only channel through which the private sector
affects the current account: the stock of domestic private capital changes with movements in
the stock of public assets, as domestic investors take into account the risk of capital levies.
'3Levy (1988) argues that historically this has been the objective of governments. She presents evidence
from Rome, England and France.
7Given this speciflcationof the taxation system, the effects of a shock to the termsoftrade
are channeled through changes in public asset accumulation. Thus, in ourmodelan improve-
ment in the terms of trade induces a deterioration of the current account because aggregate
appropriation increases more than the windfall itself. This result stands in sharp contrast to
the predictions of representative-agent models of the current account (with constant discount
factors), in the case of temporary shocks.
We also show that all the benefits of the windfall evaporate. The positive shock does
notleadto a highergrowth rateand there is a welfare gain neither for the economy nor any
fiscalgroup.Thisisbecause the positive shock exacerbates the distributive struggle (the
voracity effect), inducinga greatershare of assets to beheld privatelybypowerfulgroups.
This reduces the average rate of return in the economy. We show that in equilibrium this
Loss equals the original windfall'4.
Another result of our analysis is that the voracity effect is nonlinear in the number of
groups with access to fiscal resources. If n =2,that is fiscal power is evenly split between two
powerful groups, the voracity effect is maximised. If n > 2, the voracity effect is mitigated.
3 The Model
We consider an economy composed of a public sector and a private sector. We start by
describing the public sector. It consists of itgroupsthat have the power to appropriate fiscal
resources. Each group derives utility from the public expenditures it realizes d(t).These
expenditures include publicly-provided goods and services, government payrolls, production
and consumption subsidies and direct income transfers. The powerful groups include spend-
ing ministries, provincial governments, labor unions, trade associations and members of the
legislature, amongst others. These groups do not maximize the representative consumer's
'41tmightbe argued that short-term horizons on the part of policymakers importantly contribute to
the fiscal euphoria phenomenon we are interested in. This consideration is in fact not fundamental. One
interpretation clout model is that power alternates among different groups. When in power, a group has
complete autonomy overfiscal policy. A group that knows itwill be replaced, although it has the possibility
toappropiateas much as possible white it is in power, does riot do so. Its appropriation will be limited by
theknowledge that,even ii it is replaced,itmay return to power at some futuredateand hence the group
willwant tomaintain somestockof publicassets,given thattheraw rate of return on public assets exceeds
thaton privately-held resources.This"alternatinggovernments" game is similar to the one that we study
inthis paper. Perotti (1993)analyzes thecurrent accountina setting in which fiscal policy is determined
by votingamong incomeclasses enjoying different degreesofinternational mobility.
8wetfare as in the standard models. The objective function of group i is
a
J (1) 0 a—I
We can think of this objective function as reflecting the benefits to a powerful group of
providing transfers to its constituents. These benefits to the powerful group might take the
form of votes or direct bribes. For simplicity, in the model we identify these benefits with
the utility flows enjoyed by private agents as given by (6) below.
Next we describe the budget constraints of the powerful groups. Each group has access
to aggregate fiscal resources, in the sense that during each instant, it can appropriate up to
a proportion of aggregate fiscal assets. Note that, unlike the representative agent case, the
expenditures of each group need not match its fiscal appropriations period by period, when
there are multiple groups sharing a common pool. It is only over the long run that these
decisions are linked. This is because a group may find it optimal to appropiate some amount
of public assets in a given period, given that commonly-held assets are open to appropriation
by other groups. However, it may suit the group to store its appropriation privately and
spend at a later date. In the representative-agent case these decisions are identical because
there is no danger that others will consume what the group does not appropiate.
This delinking captures the way in which several fiscal systems work. For intance, in
some systems provinces and state-owned enterprises maintain separate balance sheets and,
by issuing bonds or investing surplus resources, are free to determine the timing of their
expenditures independently of the arrival of resources from the center. A second instance
is that of a fiscal group appropiating resources to purchase some durable good providing a
stream of benefits and being free to determine its depletion rate over time.
We formalize these ideas by assuming that the amount appropriated by group i at time
g,(t) need not be equal to its expenditure d(t). If there is a surplus of g(i) over d1(t),it
cart be safely stored by group i. It follows that the budget constraints faced by each group
are the aggregate public sector constraint
A(t)=cxA(i)+ T(t) —Et1g(t) (2)
and the group's private assets accumulation equation
B(i)=flB1(t)+g(t)—d1@) (3)
In addition A(t)andB(i)mustsatisfy the following constraints
A(t)￿O, (4)
9where B <0is possible. Note that if there is only one agent with the power to assign
appropriationsto the n groups, then appropriation is set equalto expenditure periodby
period. The problem then reduces to a representative government model. We consider this
case in subsection 3.2.
In equation(2), T(i) is tax revenue, and A(i) is the stock of net public assets. A(i) is
internationally tradeable and it has a rate of return a in terms of the importable good. 81(t)
are the net assets privately held by group i, in the sense that no other group has access
to them. B consists of non-internationally tradeable assets. As discussed earlier B- may
include SOEs, assets of provincial governments, unexercised claims on the central budget or
dirty and hidden money.
As discussed in the introduction, B1(t) represents inefficient investments relative to letting
the national fiscal authority accumulate internationally tradeable assets or leaving resources
in the hands of the private sector until transfers are actually made. They are socially
inefficient mechanisms to transfer public assets to the private domain of strong groups. To
capture this idea we assume that
(5)
Now we describe the private sector and derive the tax revenue function. The representa-
tive private agent derives utility from consumption and from the public services it receives
J1[o.Ic(t)'+
1di(t)'] c"git (6)
Theprivate agent has two investment opportunities available. It can invest abroad and
receive an after.tax rate of return f, or it can invest domestically, producing an export good
with a linear technology. It follows that its accumulation equation is
147(t) =[1
—r(t)Jp(t)k(t)+ f[VV(t)— k(t)]—c(t)Y(t) —c(fl (7)
where W(t)aretotal private assets, and k(t) are private assets invested domestically. Private
assets can be costlessly and instantaneously transferred to and from abroad". The private
agent chooses sequences {k(t)) and {c(t)}inorder to maximize (6) subject to (7) and the
tax policy of the government.
Recall that the government we are considering is not a benevolent one that maximizes
social welfare. We assume that the fiscal authority maximizes the present value of fiscal
"In some models ofthecurrent account there are adjustment costs to investment: see Matsuyama (1981),
Rain (1993) and Obstfeld and R.ogoff (1994). Incorporating adjustment costs into our model would not
provide additional insight into the fiscal mechanism we are interested in.
10revenue. rube fiscal authority can tax domestic production at any rate it desires and it can
expropriate the entire stock of capita! held domestically. However, it cannot tax foreign
source income,inthis setup the fiscal authority will increase the tax rate in response to a
positive shock in order to capture all the gains. Conversely, in the face of a negative shock it
will reduce the tax rate. This implies that the response to shocks will be channeled through
the government sector, not through private agents.
Given this revenue-maximising behaviour, the voracity effect described above and the
ability of private domestic agents to invest abroad, we will show in the remainder of this
subsection that the equilibrium tax revenue function T(A,p)isextremely simple and has
the lollowing properties: TA> 0,2',, >0,TA,,> 0,where p(t) is the price of the export
good in terms of the consumption good [i.e. the terms of trade]. The signs of the derivatives
are intuitive: a wealthier government (high 4(t)]willbe less likely to expropriate private
capital because it can be more easily punished. Thus, more domestic investment takes place,
increasing the tax base. Holding fixed the wealth of the government, an increase in the
terms of trade or in productivity raises the attractiveness of domestic investment, which
again implies an increasing tax base.
During each instant the timing is as follows. First, p(t) is revealed. Second, the tax
authority announces and commits to a tax rate r(t).Third,the private sector chooses
k(t). Fourth, the government decides whether to expropriate the entire stock of k(t). As
it is a commonly assumed in the international debt literature, if there is expropriation,
the government is forced by the international community to repay to the private sector
,n.zn[k(1).0.4(1)] ''i.
Since there are no adjustment costs, private agents choose during each instant k(t) to
maximize Y(t) in (7). Therefore,
k0)=5 OA(t)if[1 — r(t)]p(t)￿f
(8) 0 otherwise
We assume that the economy is sufficiently productive, so that for any realization of p(t),
k(t)> 0if r(t) = 0
p(t)￿p>f>0 (9)
where p is a constant. it follows from (8) and (9) that the tax rate that maximizes the
'6See Eaton (1993) Cohen and Sachs (1986).Typically, inthesemodelsthegameisbetween agovernment
and inLernational banks. Here the game is betweenthe government andprivate (international) investors.




Since fiscal revenue isrpk,using(8) and (10) we have that
T(p(t),A(t)) =O[p(t)
—f]A(t) (u)
Thebasic point of equation (11) is that fiscalrevenue isincreasing in A(t), and that this
relation becomes steeper at higher p(t)". Substituting (11) in (2) we have that
A(t) =r(p(t))
—E1g(t),r(p(t)) a + Op(t) —11) (12)
where r(p(t)) >0 isthe total rate of return faced by the public sector.
To finalize the description of the economy we specify the process followed by p(t). We
consider the following process
(t) —J pJOrt Ct1andt￿ £2
(13) p —
p+c forte[t1,t2)
A permanent shock corresponds to £2 =. Theinformation set of all agents is the following.
At any t Ct everyoneexpects p(t) =pfor all t. At t =tan unexpected shock takes place
and everyone learns the values of and of t218.
in the remainder of this section we will show that in the divided government case any
positive shock, regardless of whether it is permanent or temporary, leads to a deterioration
ofthe current accountin the short run. We will contrast this result with the representative
agent: case, in which positive temporary shocks lead to improvement in the current account.
3.1 The Divided Government Case
Inthis caseeach group chooses sequences {gj} and {d} in order to maximize (1)subject to
(3), (4), (12), (13), the strategies followed by the other groups, and
0 <g(t)￿ A(t),r(p)+$e— $< ￿ (14)
1711insteadof settingTO)optimally we restricted it to be a constant, the tax revenuefunctionwould have
thesame properties as (11): T >0, TA >0, TA >0.
Theanalysis in what follows holds equally well for multiplicative productivityshocks as for terms of
tradeshocks. For simplicity, we just refer generically to terms of trade disturbances.
12iA(t) isthe upper bound on the appropriation each group can make. We have set the lower
houndon1sulEiciriitlyhigh so that (14)is not binding in equilibrium. In addition we impose
the following restrictions on parameters
z(/3)>0,vi < I + [r(p)— $]/z($) (15)
Throughout the paper we will repeatedlyuse the expression z.For any variableX,z(X) is
definedas
z(X) X[1 —a]+ Sc
We show in Appendix A that z(fi) > 0 is necessary for the value function to be bounded.
Note that if a =1,this condition reduces to the familiar condition 5 > 0. The second
condition is necessary and sufficient for the B4(i)'s to be increasing along the equilibrium
path.This insures that constraint (4)is not binding along the equilibrium path.
Groupschoose their appropriation rates in a noncooperative manner. We assume that
groups cannot coordinate and attain the efficient outcome, which is not to use the private
technologies (3),asthe Coase Theorem would suggest.
Theproblem described above is a differential game. The solution concept we will use is
Markov Perfect equilibrium.Astrategy of group i consists of an appropriation policyand
anexpenditurepolicy. A strategy is Markov ifit isa function solely of the realization of the
state. Ann.tupteof strategies forms a Markov Perfect equilibrium iftheyarebest responses
toeach other at every realization of the state[Maskinand Tirole (1988)J. In this model the
state has n+2 elements {p(i), Au), B1(t)
We show in appendix A that there is a unique interior Markov perfect equilibrium in
this game, i.e., one whereg(t) c forall i.Inorder to characterize itwewill findn
strategies, one foreach group: ({d(t)}, {91(t)}),with the propertythatstarting at each
instant, strategy i maximizes the payoff of group i, taking as given the strategies of the other
n-I groups, and subject to (3), (4), (12) and (14). Since we are restricting strategies to be
Markov, we can find the equilibrium as the solution to a set ofnHarniltonianproblems.
This is doneinAppendix A by taking the following steps: when solvingfor thestrategy of
group i we postutategljt) = x:(p(t))A(t),withr:1(p(t))anunknown piecewise continuous
function. We then determine endogenously the x7's and the d's. Lastly, we show that the
solutionwe found is the unique interiorequilibrium.
13In the interior equiLibrium
g(t)= x(r(p(t)))A(t) =rQi(t))
T A(t) (16)




A(t2)ezp ("'[t —21) t￿ i2
B(t; 34)= [A(s4)+ Bj(s4)]e0_t_ —A(t),iE (sh,sh+i) (19)
h={0,1,2,3} s=O, .s1=i1, 2=2,8=
Theintuition behind this result is as follows. Suppose that group i owns the entire stock A(t),
and that each of the other groups sets 95(t) =x1(r(p(i)))A(t),with x1(r(p(L))) an unknown
function. It follows that i's perceived rate of return on A(t) is r(p(t)) —E1x(r(p(t))).
During each instant group i must decide how to allocate its wealth between A(t) and B(t).
In order for i to set x(r(p(t))) cit is necessary that the rate of return on i's private
technology $ be equal to i's rate of return on A(t) after appropriation by other groups. This
implies that the foltowing condition must hold for any i in an interior equilibrium
fi =r(p(tfl)—E1x1(r(p(tfl), i=
Notethat this condition holds simultaneously for all i, if and only if, all x1(r(p(t)))'s are
identical and are given by x'(r(p(t))) in (16).
We turn now to A(t). It is derived by substituting (16) in (12). Sincex(p(t)) in (16) does
not depend on the future realizations of p(t), it follows that for t < i1 the evolution of A(i)
in (18) does not depend on whether the shock to p(i) is anticipated and, for t E (i1,12), it
is independent of the duration of the shock (permanent or temporary). Therefore, it follows
from (18) that a positive shock to productivity or to the terms of trade whether expected
or unexpected, temporary or permanent, has the effect of reducing the growth rate of net
public assets. Namely
= <0for L t < t2 (20)
8€ n—I
14Note that not only does the growth rate of A(t) fall, but for sufficiently large c it becomes
negative during the period [t1, t2).
This result conies from the voracity effect: if I save the windfall, she will grab it. The
intuition is as follows. The higher r(p(t))leadsto an increase in the raw growth rate of net
public assets (Le., before appropriation by other groups). As r(p(t))goesup1 each group
can afford to be more voracious and still leave the other groups with a post-appropriation
rate of return on net public assets equal to 3. However, in the aggregate this leads to a
greater increase in the appropriation rate than the original increase in fiscal revenue. This is
an instance of a dynamic externality in a common pool context. Hence, ex-post the positive
shock leaves public finances in a worse shape!
This result is at the heart of the paper. The mechanism by which this perverse outcome
occurs is as follows. Note that the raw [i.e. pre-appropriation] rate of return goes up by
tsr(t1) = 9€ when the shock occurs. This increase in the raw rate of return represents
an opportunity for some group to increase its appropriation rate without reducing, below
/3 the post-appropriation rate of return faced by other groups. In equilibrium, every group
increases its appropriation rate by this reasoning and the size of the individual increase, from
equation (16), is given by Ar(p(ti))1-j.Thislack of coordination implies that the aggregate
appropriation rate increases by tsr(p(ti))2tj.whichis greater than tsr(p(ii)).Asa result
the growth rate of net public assets falls: tsA/A=tsr—tsrn/[n—11= —Oc/[n — 1]. In this
sense, then, a positive shock results in a deterioration in the state of the public finances.
An interesting feature of the model, which follows from (20), is that starting from n=2
as we increase the number of groups, the negative effect of an increase in r(p(t)) on A(t)
becomessmaller. With more groups, each one increases its appropriation rate by less as r
goes up. Moreover, individual appropriation declines at a faster rate than the number of
groups. Therefore, the aggregate appropriation rate declines with the number of groups for
it > 2. An analogous result pertaining to the number of unions involved in wage-setting
obtains in Alesina and Perotti P994].
Next we consider the intuition behind d and B. Regardless of how each group distributes
its resources between the common and the private technology, it faces a rate of return $ in
equilibrium. Consequently, as in the representative agent model, its expenditure grows at
the constant rate a[$ — 8J, where u is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and 5
is the discount rate. What is surprising about (17) is that d(l) does not jump when the
unexpected shock occurs at t1. Moreover, the expenditure path is independent of shocks to
p. This is because an increase in p leads to a greater appropriation rate (the voracity effect).
This induces a lower intensity in the use of the public technology and a greater intensity in
15the use oftheprivate inefficient technologies.This shift in resources implies efficiency losses
froma social perspective. In equilibrium this loss in aggregate efficiency turns out to equal
the original gain induced by the increase in p. Using different terms, on the interval [t1,t2)
4(t) + B(t)isindependent of the path followed by p(t). To see this add up (18) and (19)
togetA(t)+ B(t) =[A(ti)+ B(ti)]e'fl[t—tJ,and note that it is independent of the
path of p(t). The intensification of the voracity effect exactly cancels the direct effect of the
windfall and the aggregate growth rate fails to increase.
One can also show that the improvement in the terms of trade does not generate any
welfare gains- By substituting (17) in (1), we have that for any path of the terms of trade
that satisfies (9), the payoff of group i is given by
J(A(O) + B1(O)) = LA(O) + B1(O)]'z(fi)4 (21)
Equation (21) states that the welfare of each group, and hence social welfare, is not affected
by the path of the terms of tradet9. From a theoretical perspective this might be a surprising
result. However, it is consistent with the finding of GeIb (1988) and Little et al. (1993)
that many countries squander terms of trade windfalls. We summarize the results of this
subsection in the following proposition
PropositionI
• If public expenditure is determined in a non-cooperative fashion, then a positive shock
to productivity or the termsoftrade, whether temporary or permanent, leads to a fail
in the growth rate of net public assets. Moreover, this growth rate becomes negative
for a sufficiently high shock.
• The fail in the growth rate of net public assets is greatest when there are two powerful
groups with access to fiscal revenue.
• All the benefits of the windfall are dissipated: the growth rate of the economy does not
increase, and the welfare of each powerful group (and social welfare) remain unchanged.
The first part of proposition I applies to either a temporary or a permanent shock because
in a Markov Perfect equilibrium, strategies depend only on the current realization of the state.
Thus, the appropriation rate at time t and dA(t)/dt are just a functions of p(t) as can be
seen in (16) and (18).
'9With a fixed tax rate, welfare of powerful groups would remain constant, but the private sector would
enjoy increased welfare.
163.2 The Unitary Government Case (n=1)
Thiscaseoccurs when there exists onlyone agent with the power to allocate expenditures
among the n groups, or when all powerful groups determine fiscal policyin a cooperative way.
We shall show that in this case predictions analogous to those of the representative agent
model of the current account hold. In this case, technology (3) is dominated by technology
(12) because r(p(t)) > 8. Therefore, it is optimal to set g(t)= d(t), and the problem is
to maximize (1) subject to (4), (12) and (13). This problem is analogous to the standard
consumption-savings problem with a representative agent, and a fixed discount rate.
The effects of an unexpected and temporary increase in p(t) at 21 are well known (Obstfeld
and Rogoff (1994), and Razin (1993)). The temporary windfall will be saved in order to be
able to smooth government expenditures over the infinite horizon. That is, there is an
increase in the growth rate of net public assets during the period [ti, t3).
In our setup, if the increase in p(2) is permanent, the growth rate of net public assets
also increases unambiguously during the period [ti, oo). We show in Appendix B that if the
shock is unanticipated and permanent, the equilibrium is
d(t) = z(r(P(t)))A (22)
K t — < '
23 ( —
1 A(tj)eLt(P)+Ut_hltt_thlfor￿t1
Thevalue function is bounded if and only z(r(p + c)) > 0, which we assume to hold. By
taking the derivativc of (23) with respect to c we have that
= aG> 0 for I￿ t (24)
It is interesting to contrast this result with the divided government case. In that case
an improvement in the terms of trade, whether temporary or permanent, leads to a fall in
the growth rate of net public assets. With a unitary government, it leads to an increase in
the growth rate of net public assets. In neither case is the government benevolent. In both
cases it extracts as much fiscal revenue as possible. Hence we can attribute this difference to
the fact that with a unitary government the familiar spending smoothing effect is at work.
With a divided government, the existence of the voracity effect does not allow the smoothing
effect to operate. That is, if a group were to reduce its appropriation of public assets, it
would have no reason to believe that it will gain: the public assets it does not appropiate
would be captured by some other group.
For further reference we will summarise the points made here in the next proposition
17Proposition 2
If there exists only one agent that determines the appropriations of each group, or if all
powerful groups behave cooperatively, then an unexpected improvement in the terms of
tradeorinproductivity, permanent or transitory,will increase the rate of accumulation of
publicassets.
3.3The Current Account
Thecurrent account can be defined in threeequivalentways: (i) the change in the holdings
by domestic citizens ofnetforeign assets: CA(t)A(t) + F(i); (ii) domesticsavings minus
domesticinvestment: CA(t)S(t) — !(t) or (iii) net exports plus net factor payments from
abroad:CA(t)X(t) —M(t)+ fF(t) + aA(t) 2021
Inthe previous sectionwe characterized the accumulationof public assets A. Now we
will characterizethe privatesector accumulation equation F. Recall that the government
setsthe tax rate according to (10), and that the representativeinvestor setsk(t)according
to (8). It follows thatalongthe equilibrium paththe representative investor receives the
same rate of return at home and abroad: f.Therefore, accumulation equation(7)becomes
141(t)=JW@)
—c(t) (25)
Hence theproblem of the representative investoris to choose a sequence {c(t)} in order to
maximize(6) subject to (25). Since the sequence of di's is not influenced by the investor,
andsincethed1's do not affect the marginal utility of consumption, the choice of c(t) is
as in the standard consumption-savings problem. Therefore, using the same methods as in
Appendix B itfollowsthat
c(t) = z(f)W(t) (26)
= W(O)d_0( (27)
201nthis footnote we show that in our rnodelthe three definitions are equivalent. We start with S — .1.
Income is pk + 3EB+aA + f? consumption is c + Ed, and domestic investment is SB, + k. Thus
S — I=[p4 + E#B1 + ciA+ IF— c — Edi] — [Là1+k].Sinceg=A1—fiB1 + d1 (by (3)), we have that
S—I(aA+rpk—Sgj]+[(1—r)pk+fF—c—k)A+fr(by(2),(7)1and F= W—k). Weconsider
now the third definition. Exports are p/c,importsare Sgj c± k. Followingthe samesteps asbeforeone
can show the equivalence of this definition with A +
31.4(t) iscomposedsolely of external asaet& We could allow thefiscal authorityto also hold domestic
assets, in which case a would be interpreted as an index of the average rate of return on commonly-held
external and domestic assets. This modification would not substantively alter the central resultsofthe
analysis.
18As in the previous section, z(f)> 0is necessary for the value function to be bounded. Since
W(t) =F(t)+ !C(t), it follows from (8) and (27) that along the equilibrium path
F(L) = — 61W(t)—0A(i) (28)
This completes the analysis of the private sector. Substituting(28) inthedefinitionof the
current account we obtain the following along the equilibrium path
CA(t) =[1 — 9]A(i)+ cr[f —5]W(i) (29)
Thecurrent account has two components: the accumulation of net public assets A plus the
accumulation of net private assets abroad. The latter is the difference between the accu-
mulation of total private wealth W and domestic private investment It. Since the domestic
government is prone to expropriate, investors just keep at home a portion OA(t) of their
wealth. Thus k =CA.
To analyse the impact effect of an improvement on the terms of trade in the current





Note that the impact effects of a temporary improvement in the terms of trade are of
opposite signs under the unitary and divided government regimes. For the divided govern-
merit case the intuition is as follows. An increase in Ptleadsto a fall in the accumulation of
public assets. This has two short.run effects. On the one hand it reduces the accumulation
of net public assets. This deteriorates the current account one-to-one. On the other hand,
there is a reduction in the rate at which the private sector accumulates domestit capital.
This improves the current account by a proportion 0. Since 0 <1,an increase in the terms
of trade deteriorates the current account.
In our model the reaction of the private sector to the shock is an asset reallocation.
Private consumption does not react. This is because the government adjusts the tax rate in
order to capture all the gains in productivity. Therefore, the change in p(t) does not affect
the rate of return on W(t). Hence, the paths of c(t) and P(t) are independent of p(i).
Finally, note that since (30) is decreasing in n, the deterioration of the current account
is greater for n =2than for n >2.For further reference we will summarize the results of
this subsection in the following proposition
19Proposition 3
The impact effect of anunexpected improvement in the terms of trade or in productivity,
transitory or permanent, is
• An improvement in the current account if there is just one group with the power to
determine fiscal policy, or if all the powerful groups behave cooperatively.
• An dctcriorat ion in the current account if there are multiple groups with the power
to determine fiscal policy. Moreover, the greatest deterioration in the current account
occurs when it= 2.
4 Adjustment to Booms: Case Studies
Westudy two episodes of large commodity pricemovements: the coffee shock of 1975-79
andthe oil shock of 1979-82. We consider Indonesia, Mexico andNigeria, which were big
oilexporters, and Cote d'Ivoire, Costa Rica and Cameroon,whichwereimportant coffee
exporters.In addition, westudythe case ofChileanadjustmenttocopper pricefluctuations
over196.5-68and 1984-88. Chile experienced a significantpolitical regime shift in the 1970s,
whichmakes it an interestinglaboratorycase for the dependence of external adjustment on
the structure of the fiscal process. We focus on thissmallgroupin order toemphasisethe
fiscal mechanism highlighted in the model, andbecause thereis consensus inthe literature
concerningthe nature of theirfiscal structure22.
First,we establish that thedisturbances wereindeedexpectedto have a ubstantial
temporary component. such that policies leading to an improvementinthe currentaccount
were appropiatefrom a social welfare perspective. Second,we classify fiscal structuresac-
cording to the degree of central control that existsover publicexpendituredecisionsand
show that thehulkof windfalls accrued to the governments of these countries. Third, we
consider thesavings,investment and current account responses to theseshocks and argue
thatthebehaviourof these variables wascloselylinked to the prevailingfiscal structure
and were perverseinthose countries in which the fiscal structure was of a common pool
type23.Conversely, we show that countries which operateunderaunitary fiscal process —
inwhichadequate controls were imposedoneach groupwith access to thefiscalbudget —
22Getb(1988) and Little et aI. (1993) survey the adjustment experiences of larger samptes of countries.
23We emphasise the savings and investment dimensions of adjustment. The effects of a terms of trade
boom on the realexchange rate andon the traded sector have been exhaustively analysed in the literature.
See Corden and Neary (t982), Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986) and Gavin (1993)
20were better able to avoid such fiscal euphoriaandtoadjust inthe manner prescribed by the
representative agent model. Finally, we compare the growth performancesof these countries.
Thefact that a fiscal process is nominally unitary [e.g. anautocraticleader having
executive control over public expenditure] does notmeanit isunitary in practice —for
instance,an autocrat maydependon the support of provincial bossestoremain in power.
Similarly, a federal fiscal structure in itself does not imply the existence of a common pool
problem. What matters is whether the potential claimants have the effective power to
appropiate resources from the fiscal budget. This is what we try to assess in our study of
individual country experiences.
4.1The Coffee Shock, 1975-79
In July 1975, frost destroyed asubstantialproportion ofBrazil'scoffeetrees[whichtake
aboutfour yearsto be replaced].As a result coffee prices increased 216 percent in 1975-77
before declining in 1978-79. The magnitude of this shock for coffee-exporting nations was
large, corresponding to 14.5 percent of CDP in Carneroon in 1976-77, 10 percent in Costa
Ricaand 25.9 percentinCote d'Ivoire[seeTable 1) . The increaseincoffee prices was clearly
expectedto he a temporary phenomenon and would be reversed when Brazilian production
recovered to previous levels. The 1975-79 coffee shock, then, provides a natural experiment
of an unanticipated, temporary disturbance for which the representative agent model delivers
a clear prediction of current account improvement.
From Table I, we see that a large proportion of the coffee windfall directly accrued to
the government in the form of higher revenues. While Cameroon succeeded in improving
its current account during the period of high coffee prices, Costa Rica and Cote d'Ivoire
suffered significant deterioration in their external accounts. A similar pattern appears in
the behaviour of government expenditure: Cameroon reduced government spending as a
share of GDP during this period, whereas the other two countries experienced an increase in
the government's expenditure share. The contrast in country performance is perhaps most
striking in terms of the growth rates that were subsequently attained after the coffee boom,
with Cameroon growing robustly but Cote d'Ivoire andCostaRicahaving little per-capita
outputgrowth [see Table 3).Thesegrowth ratesmay be viewed as a commentary on how
productivelyeach country allocated its coffee windfall. We can further illustrate the variation
intheefficiency ofinvestmentamong these countriesbya simple numerical example. Take,
for example, a 20 percent rate of return on investment as a benchmark figure. Over the
1975-80 period, this benchmark would predict average output growth of 4.4percent,5.3
percentand 5.9percentfor Cameroon, Costa Rica andCoted'Ivoire respectively. Actual
21Table 1: TilE COFF'EE SHoCK 1975-79
SIZE OFTHE WINDFALL
Cameroon Costa Rica Coted'Ivoire
(TOT/GDP)(TOT/X)(TOT/GDP)1(TOT/X)(TOT/GDP)1(TOT/X)1
197€ 6.0 50.5 6.3 23.7 12S 44.9
1977 2.7 28.0 4.7 17.7 7.3 29.3
1978 -2.4 -21.4 -5.7 -20.8 -4.5 -19.1
1979 -1.7 -14.4 -.6 -2.2 -.6 -2.7
TOT =X * (%APx/%APM) is the size ofthetermsof trade shock. For an explanation of
thisformula seeAppendixC. X denotes total exportsin constant prices, PX,PMareunit
value price indices. Ratios are multiplied by 100.
ADJUSTMENT TO THE WINDFALL
CameroonCosta Rica Cote d'Ivoire
CA/CNP .4 -1.7 -5.7
AS/GNP 1.2 .8 5
a11/GNP 3.5 1.8 6.1
EsREV/GDP 2.5 3.1 —
L?SEXP/GDP.3 &4 3.05
Change in CA/GNP,S/GNP, I/GNP1976-79 relativeto 1970- 72 base. Thebase period
is chosen to abstract from the large oil shock of 1973-74. CA/GNP is ratio of current
account to CNP. S/GNP is ratio of national savings to CNP. I/GNP is ratio of domestic
investment to CNP. REV/GDP and EXP/GDP are central government spending and
revenue shares. For Cameroon, the base year for LSREV/GDP and AEXP/GDP is 1975,
dueto missingdata. For Cote d'Ivoire, missing data mean that government consumption
proxies for government expenditureand the biseis 1971-72.Source: WorldTables, Little et
al.(1993), iFS.growth rates forthese countries were 11.6 percent,4 percent and 4.3 percentrespectively.
Thesepoor returnson investment in Costa Rica and Cote d'Ivoire relative to the benchmark
or Carneroonis in linewithour claim concerningthemotivationsunderlying investment
decisions inthesecountries24.Nextwe give somehistoricalbackground to explainwhy
Cameroonhada unitary fiscal process, while Costa Rica and Cote d'Ivoire did not.Wealso
describesome of the unprofitableprojectsthatwere undertaken with thewindfall income.
Cameroori moved from pluralist to single-party representationin1966 andfrom afed-
eral system to a unitary governmentin1972 under PresidentAhidjo. The shift to a cen-
tralisedregime wasledby Ahidjo and involved the repressionof other influential factions
inCameroon,includingthejailing in1962 offour keyoppositionleaders (Mbida, Okala,
Mayi-MatipandEyidi),the dissolutionof theUPCparty congress in 1962 and strong pres-
sureonopposition deputiestojoin Ahidjo'sparty, the Union Camerounaise [see Le Vine
(1986)andConnolly(1991)]. Legislators inthedissolvedprovincial assemblies either retired
orweregranted sinecure positions by the new regime. This centralisationofpower granted
substantialexecutiveautonomy to the president. Ahidjo's autonomy facilitated the banking
of the increasedrevenues, givenfactional groups' lack of access to the fiscal budget.
In Costa Rica, the president and Congress failed to recognise the victory of the con-
servative Otilio Ulate in the 1948 presidential election. As a result, the Social Democratic
movement, tinder Jose Figueres, led an insurrection which resulted in the installation of Ulate
as president [see Jacobstein 1987]. In the 1949 constitution, which was written by these two
parties, the executive autonomy of the president was severely restricted. The constitution
denied the president the right to veto budgetary laws adopted by the legislature; provided for
the establishment of "autonomous institutions" free of presidential influence [two hundred
were created by 1969]; and imposed four year term limits on congressmen. The proliferation
of the autonomous institutions, intended as a check on presidential power, had the effect of
dividing control over the fiscal process in Costa Rica.
The PLN came to power in 1953 under Figueres and power subsequently alternated be-
tween the PLN and the conservative party. The import-substitution program and the PLN
vision of an interventionist state role in promoting development led to the emergence of
a cadre of "politician-entrepreneurs", playing dual roles as important actors in both the
PLN and Costa Rican industry. These business ventures were backed by the state, either
directly or implicitly through soft credit policies. The most important vehicle for the ac-
tivities of the "politician-entrepreneurs" was CODESA, the state holding company, which
was established in 1972. CODESA was state-owned but constituted as a private corporation
24See Devarajanand de Melo (1987) for a comparison of CaineroonandCote d'Ivoire.
23and, reniarkabty, was granted direct access to Central Bank financing. During the coffee
boom, the subsidiaries of CODESA invested aggressively buying out struggling private firms
and establishing publicly-owned enterprises in activities such as fertilizer, cement, aluminum
smetting,sugar, cotton and aquaculture,obtaining financing from the Central Bank and
from externalborrowing.Thisexpansionin activitieswashighlyunprofitable, with losses
never tessthan25percent of sales in each year[see Gonzalez-Vega and Cespedes 1993].
Agoodillustration of the autonomy of these actors is the CATSA sugar mill scandal (see
Achio and Escalante 1985]. This project was initiated in 1975 [contemporaneous withthe
boom in coffee revenues] and was financed by CODESA. Construction suffered from time
overruns, and even when production began, productivity was very low [two-thirds that of
privately-owned millsJ. CATSA faced bankruptcy in 1982 with a debt of 400 million escudos.
The National Bank of Costa Rica and CODESA bailed it out. The accumulation of this debt
could be traced back to overruns on construction costs and a land-buying spree in 1977 at
prices 30-40 percent above market values. This overspending was attributed to the political
motivation underlying the entire project. It is noteworthy that these budget overruns were
incurred when government coffee revenues were at their peak during 1975-77. The sugar
industry in Costa Rica was dominated by entrepreneurs with close links to leading PlAN
officials. including Rodrigo Arias [the brother of the planning minister and future president
Oscar Arias]. Manuel Dobles, Alvaro Jenkins [the minister of transportation], Alonso Lara
and Mario Hoffrnaister. The latter three 'sugar-entrepreneurs' were on the board of the
CATSA sugar mill.
Since independence, formal power in Cote d'Ivoire has been concentrated in the hands
of President Houphouet-Boigny25. From the 1950s until 1990, there was a single party (the
PDCI). Initially it was dominated by the president and his associates, the anciens. This
changed during the 1970s. First, limited opportunities for influence generated discontent
among new members of local elites, the jetties. The discontent became so severe that in
1975 the president had to expand the number of ministries and allow jettiesin,leaving only
six anciens.Additionally,party barons with significant political machines had emerged and
appeared to be engaged in a succession race26.
The timing of the coffee windfall coincided with the tensions among regional elites and
Large projects were inaugurated in regional centers. These totaled 100 billion CFA . The best
known was the massive SODESUCRE program to create irrigated sugar plantations destined
35Histenureended only with his death in January 1994.
26Tbepower of the ancicnswas reduced in1980 bythe calling ofmulticandidateassemblyelections and
n 1990by thelegalisaticinof oppositionparties.
24to produce sugar at costs above projected world prices. Overbilling was so acute that by
1982 it had wiped out the entire value added of the company (10 billion CFA). Party barons
also increased fiscal spending in their regions in order to strengthen their position in the
succession race. The most powerful were the party chief Philippe Yace (Jacqueville), army
chief Koudio M'BahiaBle (M'Bahiakro) and the Coulibalyfamily (Korhogo)27. In addition,
during the 1970s, the president had to deal with a feud within the Coulibaly family and
attempt to reduce the wealth gap between the dominant south and the central and northern
ethnic groups in order to maintain the stability which was perceived as the cornerstone of
his regime.
The 1975-79 coffee shock, in summary, provides a natural experiment in country adjust-
ment to a temporary positive terms of trade shock. Cote d'Ivoire and Costa Rica adjusted
incautiously to the windfall, whereas Cameroon succeeded in banking much of the increased
revenues, allowing for the maintenance of higher consumption after the boom was over.
We have argued that the differences in fiscal structures described above help explain this
variation in adjustment behaviour.
4.2The 1979-82 Oil Shock
Theorigins of the 1979-80 oil price increase lay in the overthrow of the Shah in 1978, which
reduced oil exports from Iran and generated uncertainty about future oil supplies These
circumstances suggested that the oil price increase had a substantial temporary component.
Expert opinion at the time was that oil prices would significantly decline by the mid-1980s,
once oil exports from Iran resumed. The contemporary trade journals cited the large stock-
piles in oil-importing countries and the prospect of global recession as reasons why the price
increase would not he sustained [see PetroleumEconomist, Oil and Gas Journal,Adelman
(1980)]. In 1978, Data Resources Inc. projected that the real oil price needed to rise by 25
percent by 1990. Given that the actual supply reduction from Iran was low [4 % of world
production] and the existence of large stocks, this suggested that much of the 1979-80 oil
price increase would be unwound over time. Salomon Bros. argued that the OPEC price
increase "in reality should be viewed as a 2-year increase" roil andGasJournal,1/29/79].
The Economist took the position "It is possible OPEC will seize the opportunity of a small-
scale shortage to send prices temporarily soaring In time, the unstable oil markets will
returntotheir prevailing structural shortage" (2/17/79). The perception that the shock
was temporary is also reflected in the stock price performance of US-based nondiversified oil
"See Widner (1994), Zartman and Delgado (1984).
25companies . Over the 1977-1980 period,while theoilprice increased 152 percent, average
share prices icr these companies rose by only 54.4 percent[theS&P 500 rose by 42.8 percent].
Furthermore,it is striking that, even though the oil price climbed an additional 47 percent in
1981, oil shares fell 19.5 percent [the fall in the S&P 500 was only 9.7 percent]29. This pattern
is consistent with permanency of the shock only if an implausibly large demand elasticity
for oil and/or extremely strong countercyclical profit margins in refining are assumed.
From Table 2, it is clear that national governments captured a large proportion of the oil
price windfall. We see that Indonesia responded to the oil windfall with an improvement in
itscurrentaccount, while Mexico and Nigeria responded with a deterioration of the current
account. Again, weseefrom Table 2thatthe difference in current account behaviour is
mirrored bythepaths of government spending in these countries. The contrast between
the cautious adjustment response in Indonesia and the spendthrift policies in Mexico and
Nigeria is striking30. The subsequent growth performances of these countries during the 1980s
also suggest that Indonesia allocated its windfall more productively than either Mexico or
Nigeria [see Table 3]. Taking again the 20 percent investment rate of return benchmark
figure, predicted average total output growth for Indonesia, Mexico and Nigeria over the
1979-84 period would have been 5.7 percent, 5 percent and 3.2 percent respectively. Actual
growth rates were 6.1 percent, 4.2 percent and -1.6 percent respectively. This suggests the
return on investment projects undertaken in Mexico and Nigeria was low.-
Nextwe give some historical background to explain why Indonesia had a unitary fiscal
process, while Mexico and Nigeria did not. After the political turmoil of 1965-66, General
Suharto replaced Soekarno as the president of Indonesia. The massacre of Communist Party
members by the army and the economic disruptions of this period —hyperinflationand a
sharp decline in output —hadcreated a strong popular desire for stability and order. This
granted Suharto and his military backers considerable autonomy. Suharto strengthened his
power via a network of anny officers, civil servants, and state corporations [the Gollcavj.
In order to ensure economic stability, a group of university professors, the Berkdey Mafia,
was allowed to design an orthodox macroeconomic program for Indonesia. These economists
have remained in office until the present, and their program has remained highly influential
in Indonesian policymaking.
The fiscal conservatism of the Suharto administration was further enhanced by the expe-
rience of the Pertamina crisis of 1974-75, in which the head of the state oil company, General
28'These companies gained from the increase in the oil price but were not exposed to expropriation risk
from thespread of political instability from Iran toother Gulf nations
See Appendix D-
30See Pinto (1987) for a comparison of Indonesia and Nigeria.




1979 9.7 27.6 .4 13.1 13.4 26.5
1980 8.6 24.8 2.1 17.8 20.1 45.4
1981 1.5 5.7 .8 6.8 3.0 9.6
1982 -.8 -3.4 -.4 -2.8 -3.0 -7.4
ADJUSTMENT TO THE WINDFALL
IndonesiaMexicoNigeria
AGA/GNP 1.82 -2.35 -1.25
AS/GNP 4.8 8.15 -4.7
JOLJ/GNP 3.7 3.8 -5S
IREV/GDP 3.85 3.1 —
AEXP/GDP .85 5.8 1-55
See note to Table 1. zXCA/GNP, AS/GNP, àI/GNP are average changes 1979-82 relative
to 1975-77. Base period chosen for its lack of terms of trade volatility. Nigeria: revenue data
missing and AEXP/GDP is change in 1979-81 relative to 1975-77. Source: IFS, World
Tables,Little et al. (1993).
27Sutowo, had used oil revenuesto fund a massive diversification programme and ill-advised
speculationin the international oil tanker industry. Following this scandal the Berkeley
mafia wasable to implement tighter controls on parastatal spending and restrict access of
SOEs to international credit markets [see Bresnan 1993J.
The Mexican political system is dominated by the president, who has overwhelming
formal authority hut may not seek reelection, and the PR!, which has won all the presidential
elections since the 1930s. Contrary to popular belief, the apparent autonomy of the president
is limited by "strong groups that fight against each other to obtain the Presidential favors...
with the consequence that the President always tries to find, timidly and vacillating, a half
way that will not hurt anybody"31.
After the revolution of 1910, the country fell into a state of anarchy, with different military
caudillos ruling each region of the country. In 1929, after many attempts, President Calles
was able to organise the local military caudillos into one political party and transform them
into "businessmen". In exchange for privileges such as monopoly rights in different industries
and subsidized credit, the bargain was that this elite would be loyal to the Pill and ensure
electoral victories in their localities [Cordova (1972)]. The economy evolved into a highly
protected and regulated system, where the president could exercise ample power as long
as he did not violate the rights of the "Revolutionary Family". By the 1970s, one could
distinguish two strong groups: the private import-competing elite, and the.elite associated
with the SOEs32.
In the early 1970s, Mexico was a net oil importer but vast oil reserves were announced
in 1977. Mexican oil production increased from an annual 305 million barrels in 1976 to
I billion barrels in 1982. The oil boom had a positive impact on fiscal revenues, which
increased by 3.1 percent of GDP in 1979-82 [see Table 2j. The mechanisms by which the
windfall was appropriated by fiscal claimants were: increased public investment in SOEs,
unconditional government guarantees of private foreign loans, bailouts of bankrupt firms and
outright transfers. Some examples will suffice to show that these projects; far from being
the realization of profitable investment opportunities, were vehicles for redistributing fiscal
resources. First, an agreement with the oil workers' union stipulated that 40 per cent of all
contracts granted by PEMEX, the state oil monopoly, were to be awarded to the union [the
union was of course free to subcontra.ctj. The second example has to do with SOEs, which
31The quote is front Daniel Coeio Villegas (1976), p.8, a leading Mexican historian.
321t was not until the mid- 1980s, when the terms of trade collapsed 50 per cent, that the elites clashed and
weakened each other. This gave the President autonomy to act and implement radical trade liberalization,
deregulation and privatization progran (see Tornell (forthcoming)J.
TweniieTh Centisry PetrolenmSIaiü(ics(1993).
28Table 3: PER CAPITA GDP GROWTH BATES
. CameroonCosta RicaCoLe d'Ivoire IndonesiaMexicoNigeria
65-75 1.48 1.39 1.53 69-79 2.45 1.41 1.96
75-78 1.99 2.03 .9 79-82 3.27 1.05 -2.26
78-85 2.19 -.57 -.9 82-88 1.71 -L07 -2.15
Source: Summersand Heston (1991).
increased in number from 504 in 1975 to 1155 in 1982. The expansion of the parastatal
sector included the bailing out of struggling private firms. The government ended up owning
a loss-makingcabaret, a bicycle plant and a cookie producer,amongst others. Parastatals
alsoexpanded production capacity. Themost prominent example is the industrial complex
developed in the town of Lazaro Cardenas, which consisted of a steel plant, a fertilizer plant,
a capital equipment plant and a big diameter pipe producer. Although the steel plant was
designed to produce two million tons of plate (final good), it did not produce even one million
tons of stab (intermediate good). Moreover, the steel plant was of the direct reduction type,
which uses, instead of coal, gas and electricity which are scarce in Mexico. All these plants
had operating losses. The third example concerns a major private industrial group: Alfa.
It embarked on an aggressive diversification programme, financed by external borrowing. A
number of these investments turned out to be unprofitable and in 1981, months before the
debt crisis, it received from the government $500 million to repay its debts.
The source of divided fiscal control in Nigeria has been strong regional and ethnic tensions.
These tensions erupted into civil war in 1966 when the eastern region attempted to secede,
and form the republic of Biafra. A military government took power and attempted to
reduce inter-regional tensions by expanding the number of states and increasing the nominal
authority of local governments. In 1979 a democratic regime, led by Shehui Shagari, was
installed. The federal government proposed a Revenue Allocation Act which would have
Murphy(1983) estimates the steetplant was thesixth largestconstruction project in the developing
world[excluding the Gulfstates] atthe time,at acostof $8 billion.
29shared revenues according to objective criteria in order to eliminate the fiscal struggle among
regions. This legislation, however, was nullified by the courts. The result was that states
relied on informal bargaining with the federal government in obtaining ex-postfinancing for
spending plans already carried out [see Ukpong 1986]. National control on spending was
further weakened in 1980 when states were granted the right to borrow directly from abroad
without requiring approval from the federal government.
The most notorious examples of the squandering of the oil windfall were the construction
ol a new capital city in Abuja, which began in 1981, and the development of the steel
industry. Rivalry among regions led to duplication of investment projects, with steel mills
being built in both Ajaokuta and Aladja regions. Each plant has capacity of one million tons,
while total domestic demand for steel in Nigeria is around half million tons. The estimated
cost of each project was $1 billion. However, the costs turned out to be $2 and $4 billion
respectively. What is worse is that these plants have never operated at more than 25 percent
capacity. The managing director of the International Bank of West Africa estimated the
proportion of diverted funds in public investment projects at 75 percent. One leading civil
servant, Phillip Asiodu, remarked, in relation to the fiscal anarchy of this period, "it was
so much easier to sign up road and harbour projects and other infrastructural construction
projects and run down our reserves in the process" [quoted in Bangura 1987].
4.3Copper and Chile
Chileis an interesting case study for two reasons. First,its dependenceon copper exports
for foreign currency left it highly vulnerable to externally-driven fluctuations in the world
price of copper. Second, after the military coup in 1973, Chile experienced a dramatic shift
in its fiscal process from divided control to a unitary regime.
Table 4 shows how during the 1965-69 period the current account was strongly negatively
correlated with the terms of trade. In contrast, during the 1984-1988 period this correlation
became positive.
Since the nineteenth century Chile had been a democracy, with a strong parliament
dominated by a rural elite. As export earnings collapsed in the 1930s, there was a shift
to import substitution and government intervention [see Alexander 1978]. In this sheltered
economy, new fiscal claimants emerged: the import-substituting private elite and urban labor
unions. By the 1950s, each had acquired strong influence on policymaking. As an example,
Velasco [19931 details that private business interests had one-third representation on the
"What follows draws on Bangura (1987) andMontenegro (1993).
30Source: International Monetary Fund
etaryFundsIFS. WorldTables.
Table 4: CHILEAN ADJUSTMENT
Table 5:Chilean PerCapita Growth
60-6565-7070-7373-8383-8686-8888-91
Li 1 .04 -.4 .8 1.84.2
Source: Summers and Heston (1991).
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(TOT/CDP)(TOT/X)ACA/CNPAS/GNPt111/GNPREV/GDPLSEXP/c
1965 1.5 12.3 1.8 2.2 .7 2.3 1.7
1966 3.1 22.5 -.8 -4 -.1 2.1 1.3
1967 -.7 -5.2 .5 -2.5 -2.6 1.1 -.S
1968 .9 6.7 -1.2 .2 7 .7 1
1985 -.5 -1.7 2.3 2.9 .3 .2 .1.5
1986 -2.5 -9 1.9 2 1.1 -.7 -Li
1987 2.2 7.7 3.3 5.8 2.9 .5 -.9
1988 4.4 15.9 3.9 3.8 0 -.4 .5
IFS. ECLA. Ffrench-Davjs (1973). International Mon-boards of major policymaking agencies and fiscal allocations could not be decided without
the approval of leading industrialists. The four most powerful business organizations had
voting membership in such major policy institutions as the state financial agency CORFO
and the Central Bank. CORFO could in effect issue money, with the result that industrialists
were able to channel public resources, in the forms of subsidies and cheap credit, to their
own businesses. Militant urban labour unions, led by the Socialist and Communist Parties,
captured some of these rents Isee Ffrench-Davis (1973)].
In 1964 the Christian Democratic Party (the ADC), formed in the 1950s, obtained the
presidency under Eduardo Frei. The ADC, however, did not control the Senate and faced
strong opposition to its ambitious land redistribution program. In order to establish an
independent power base, the ADC formed still more claimants on the state: rural unions
and urban-poor organizations. The degree of division was reflected in an increase in the
number of strikes from 676 in 1966 to 1623 in 1970 [Mendez (1980)).
Theregime shift started in 1970, when the socialists under Allende obtained the presi-
dency. They implemented a radical and violent expropriation program, which dealt a blow to
the rural and business elites. The response was a military coup in 1973 headed by Pinochet.
To the surprise of many, Pinochet liberalized trade in 1975, destroying most of the import
substituting sector. This was the final blow to the political power of the business elite.
Industrialists, however, did not oppose trade liberalization because it was the means to
emasculate the labour unions [indeed, the unionization rate declined from nearly 40percent
in 1973 to 12 percent in 1989]. Business interest turned to the export of forestry andagri-
cultural products and the services sector. As established elites weakened one another, then,
the Pinochet regime acquired autonomy to act, converting Chile to a unitary fiscal structure
[Velasco (1993)].
5 Conclusions
In several countries that have enjoyed sizable temporary terms of trade improvements, the
current account has not improved in the face of the temporary windfall. Also, windfalls
appear to be as much a curse as a blessing, in that they do not lead to an increase in the
growth rate of these countries. This appears to be related to increased spending on inefficient
capital projects.
The point we make in this paper is that the structure of the fiscal process is critical in
determining outcomes. In countries in which there exist strong control over the national
budgetary process, pressures to increase spending in the wake of extra resources can be suc-
32cessfully resisted, and an improvementin the current account takesplace —aspredictedby
representative-agentmodels of thecurrentaccount. Conversely, if there is divided control
over the fiscal process, via excessive autonomy on the part of subnational levels of govern-
ment, the parastatal sector or spending ministries, then the voracity effect described in this
paper is allowed to operate and a perverse outcome occurs.
We model the interaction among the claimants on the state as a differential game, and
establish theoretical support for the "horror stories" of wasteful investment responses and
negative movements in the current account in response to terms of trade improvements.
When a positive shock occurs, the common national budget constraint is relaxed and it
is privately optimal for each powerful group to appropiate extra public assets, even if this
implies storing theni inefficiently (e.g. in unproductive investment projects). We show that
in equilibrium aggregate appropriation grows more than the windfall itself, regardless of the
expected duration of the shock. This results in a deterioration of the current account. We
also show that in equilibrium all the windfall is dissipated, with the country experiencing no
increase in its GDP growth and with no welfare gain, despite the favourable relative price
movement. -
Animplication of the model is that when fiscal control is divided, countries that enjoy
windfalls fail to attain higher growth rates. This is because the windfall induces an increase
in redistributive activity. Although there is an increase in investment, it is typically directed
towards inefficient projects. As a result the aggregate growth rate does not increase. We
believe that this investment-composition channel can help reduce the significance of the
significance of African and Latin American dummies in cross-country growth regressions.
In future work we plan to test the predictions of the model for the current account
responses and growth rates in a large panel of countries. Such a project involves constructing
an index that directly measures the degree of division of control over the fiscal process.
Typologies such as democracy versus autocracy do not have predictive power, as is clear
from our case studies.
Appendix
A The Divided Government Case
We will find n strategies, one for eachgroup: ({d1(t)), {91(t)lfl,withthe property that start-
ing at each instant, strategy i maximizes the payoff of group i, taking as given the strategies
of the other n-l groups, and subject to (3), (4), (12) and (14). A pair ({d1(tfl, {91(t))) is
33optimal for group i only if it satisfies the first order conditions associated with the following
prcsent valueIlarniltortian
111(A,B, gi, d) = o'/[o —i]d(t)1°'1"°+ 'j(t)[r(p(tflA(t) — (A.l)
Ex1(p(i))A(t) —g(t))+ çó,(i)[,821(t) + g(i) —d(t))
We did not include the inequality constraints (4) and (14). It turns out that they are
not binding in the interior equilibrium. The first order conditions are
=(t) (A.2)
= 1(t) (A.3)
= 5— /3 (A.4)
= 8 —r(p(t))+ Ex(p(t)) (A.5)
= OJ(B(i2) + A(2))/O(B1(z) + A(t)) (A.6)
lzrn,_.00A(t)b1(t)e = 0, lime..,,Bj(t)4i(t)e_It = 0 (A.7)
where J is the maximized value of (1). To find an equilibrium candidate, we need to find a
pairs ({d(t)}, {g(t)}) that simultaneously satisfy itsetsof equations (A.2)-(A.7), one for
each group i. First we determine the form that the unknown functions x(p(i)) have to take.
From (A.3)-(A.5) it follows that along an interior equilibrium it is necessary .that for each i,
r(p(t)) —/3= E1x(p(t)). This condition holds for every i if and only if for each t all x's
are identical. Therefore, the unique value that x(p(i)) can take in an interior equilibrium
is x;(p(t)) = [r(p(t)) —flj/[n
—
11.Substituting this expression for x in accumulation
equation (12) we obtain the equilibrium path of A(t) in (18). Now we derive the equilibrium
expenditure path. Conditions (A.2) and (A.4) imply that
d(t)= j(s)e°111,Vt,s (A8)
Substituting (A8) and (16) in accumulation equation (3), and solving the differential equa-
tion we get that for all t and s
B(t)=e" {B(s)+ A(s) El—eP(t)lt9J] —[i
—e°""]di(s)fz(fl)}(A.9)
To have a complete characterization of the equilibrium path we need to determine the values
of dZ(to), d(t1)anddZ(t2).Westart with dflt2). Substituting (A.2), (A.8) and (AS) in the
second transversality condition (A.?) we get
lirn d(t2){B(t2) + A(t2) [i —
—— e_4PRt_tlll"?} =a(A.10)
34It followsfrom (5),(9) and(13) that r(p(t))>fi. Thus x'(p(t))>0.Also, we have that
4$)> 0 by (15). Therefore, the transversality condition is satisfied if and only if
= z(fi)[A(t2)+ B1(t2)J (A.1 1)
Substituting (A.ll) in (A.9) we obtain the equilibrium pathof groupi'sprivateassetsfor
2 ￿ t2
B(t)=B(t4e0O?_L_t2l+ A(22) [&TLo_hht_t21 —exp(nu3_r(P)( — (A.12)
Substituting(All) and (18) in (1)itfollows that the value of the continuationgameat
2 = t2 is
.JI(i(22)+ B1(22)) =
1[A(22)+ B1(t2))z(fl)&" (A.13)
Thisintegralis bounded only if z(r(p+ e)) > 0.
Nextwe determine dZ(ti).Takingthe derivative of (A.13) with respect to A+B1,and
substituting it. in the transversality condition (A.6), we get that #(ifl° = z(fl)[A(12)+
B,(t)].Substituting thisin (A.2)weget
= z($)[A(22)+ B1@2)] =&(ti)e0_ö)A a 22— (A.14)
The second equality follows from (A.8). Substituting (18) and (AS) in (A.14) we get
($)e
=Atj)e +e{i@i
+ A(Li) [1 —e''}
—[i
—e-]}.l5)
Substituting the equilibrium level of x given in (16) and z(f3) =fl[1
—oJ+ 6o in (A.15) we
obtaind7(t,)=z(13)[A(e1)B1(ti)J. Thus, it follows from (A.8) that
d(i)=z(fl)[A(21)+ BI tj)]e0[_öh(t_tu), 2 E[21,23) (A.16)
Substituting(A.16) in (A.9) and settings = Li, it follows that for t e [21,13)




Next we consider thetime interval [0, Li).Since theshockthatoccurs at t1isunexpected at
<t, d(0) andB1(t)are given by(A.11) and (A.12), replacing 22by0.
Thiscompletes the characterization of the interior equilibrium. To see that the candidate
pair {gr(L),d(t)) given by (16) and (17) is admissible, note first that it generates a unique
35state trajectory {A(t), B'(t)} given by (18) and (19). Second, that it satisfies the necessary
conditions (A2)- (A.7). Third, that constraints (4) and (14) are satisfied: g(t) < IA(t)
followsfrom (16) arid (14),and (4) is not bindingalongthe equilibriumpath becauseB?> 0
by (15).
Lastly, we show that the admissible pairs {g'(t),d(t),i =1,...,n) constitute an equilib-
rium. That is, that no group would attain a higher payoff (as measured by (1)) by deviating
unilaterally. Theorem 2.3 of Mehlman (1988) states that this holds if and only if the Hamil-
tonian (Al) evaluated at the optimum H(A,B1,g1(A,B),d7(A,B1)) is concave in (A,B)
Substituting (16) and (17) in (A.1) and taking derivatives we find that
=Hj8.= = —(A+ B;JYLz(fi) c o
This implies that the associated Hessian is negative semidefinite: the Hamiltonian is concave.
Since x(p(t)) in (16) is the unique solution to the system ofri equations derived from (A.3)-
(A.5) (one for each i), we conclude that (16).(17) is the unique interior Markov perfect
equilibrium.
B The Unitary Government Case
Wesolvehere for the permanent shock case. The present value Hamiltonian of this problem
is
H =(c/k
—lfld(t)°'i''] + A(t)[r(p+ c) —d(i)] (B.1)
We did riot include the inequality constraint (4). It turns out that it is not binding along
equilibrium path. The first order conditions are
C(i) =A(t)' (B.2)
=6—r(p + c) (8.3)
liins..0A(t)A(t)e't =0 (B.4)
Using the same method as in appendix A, it follows that d(t) =z(r(p))A(t)/n=[r(p+
c)[l —a)+ fic]A(t)/n. To see that condition (B.4) is satisfied we substitute (22), (23) and
(8.2) in(B.4)
1imtA(0)e01_1t[A(0)el6_&+t)lte_51 =limg.._.,A(0)A(0)e_2fr(P+o))t=0 (B.5)
Thesecond equality follows from z(r(p + c)) > 0, which is a necessary condition for the value
function to be bounded.
36Table 6: The Current Account and Terms of Trade, 1971-1985
$ i3 $2 Pa $4sp•E2NODS
.38"—.34"—.13"—.13"—.08 —.3' .28 218
SE..08 .07 .03 .03 .03 .16
Country and time effects are insignificant and not reported. Standard errors are White.
corrected. Jarque-Bera normality test=8.22 (p-value=.016). **denotessignificance at1%
level, •significanceat 5 % level. Data source: World Bank, World Tables 1993.
C Panel Data Evidence
Our objective is to identify the relationship between movements in the terms of trade and
thecurrent account, allowing for delays inadjustmentresponsesto shocks. Typically, the
contemporaneouscorrelation of the current account and the termsof trade is positive. This
captures the factthatpublic spending cannot be adjustedimmediatelyaltertheunexpected
shock occurs. However, once adjustmentin spending behaviour occurs, the initial improve-
mentis morethan offset by increased dissaving insubsequentperiods. Weran a regression
ofthe form
4
= a+ Pt + E$(TOT/GNP)1_+ pj (C.6)
j=O
where aisa country.specific constant, pisa time dummy and
TOT11 =* ((v — PxIt...1)/PxlI...I)/((PMIL—PMI(...I))/(PMIg...l) where X11isvolume of
exports,P, and are unit value indices. By weighting price movements by export share
only, the TOT is a measure oftheimpact of the terms of trade shock which is independent
oftradeimbalance distortions. The results are given in Table 6. The estimate of Eo $
is significantly negative at the 5 percent level: a terms of trade improvement leads to an
average current account decline over a five year period. The countries selected are the
union of countries studied in GeIb (1988) and Little et at. (1993). The list is Algeria,
Argentina, Brazil, Cameroon, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cote d'Ivoire, Ecuador, India,
Indonesia, Kenya, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Trinidad
and Tobago, Turkey and Venezuela.
37Table 7: Oil Share Performance, 1977-81
1978 4.6 1.1 15.7
1979 39.6 12.3 44S
1980 73.6 25.8 -4.4
1981 47.2 -9.7 -24.7
All variables are percentage changes. Share prices are year-end, from Compustat.Well-head
oil price from Twentieth Century Petroleum Statistics 1993.
D Oil Share Performance, 1977-1981
We compare the share price performance of seven US-based nondiversified oil companies to
the growth rate of the S&P 500 Composite Index and the nominal oil price. The firms are
Pennzoil, Sun, Total Petroleum, Phillips Petroleum, Atlantic Richfield, Shimnd and Amerada
Hess.
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